Exemption of Churches and Charitable Institutions from Assessments for Street Paving, Etc by Landreth, Lucius S.
EXEMPTION OF CHURCHES AND CHARITABLE
INSTITUTIONS FROM ASSESSMENTS FOR
STREET PAVING, ETC.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of the
Appeal of the M. E. Church of Sevickley, 35 W. N. C. 554,
decided in January, 1895, has overruled its own most recent
decisions on the subject, and has gone entirely contrary to the
popular and professional understanding. The appellant had
been assessed for the paving of a street in front of its church
building, the paving having been ordered by the borough
authorities in response to a petition in which the appellant had
joined. The court below, on what grounds the report of the
case does not state, upheld the assessment. The Supreme
Court affirms the judgment upon two grounds; first, that
having joined in the petition for the paving, the church was
bound in equity and good conscience to pay its share of the
cost: and second, that "taxation," from which churches were-
exempted by the Act of May i4, 1874, did not include within
its meaning special charges of this character, but included only-
general burdens, borne by the people at large. The opinion is
delivered by Chief Justice STERRETT, and there is not a dissent-
ing voice, although the concluding paragraph expressly over-
rules all former decisions inconsistent with the present ruling.
Perhaps, however, the most important feature of the opinion is
the strong intimation, that even had the Act of 1874 included
such charges in express terms, it would have made no differ-
ence, as such a provision would exceed the constitutional
power of the legislature, as the authority to exempt from
taxation was derived from the constitution, and, as before
stated, the word "taxation " did not include local assessments
for municipal improvements. Chief Justice STERRETT cites
two cases in the earlier Pennsylvania reports: Northern
Liberties v. St. "oln's Church, 13 Pa. 104, and Pray v.
Nortlern Liberties, 31 Id. 69. But he relies on Illnois Cen-
tral R. R. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190, 197. He recognizes
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the fact that local assessments are "referable to the taxing
power," but says that the distinction drawn between them and
general taxes in questions of exemption is well recognized,
and supported by "an almost unbroken line of authorities in
nearly all of our Eastern States." The effect of this decision
is very serious; and it is proposed .herein to consider the
subject as fully as space will permit; necessarily it will have
to be considered somewhat from a Pennsylvania standpoint.
But the question, and the public policy involved in it, are
much the same everywhere. First, then, as to the law of
Pennsylvania, as it stood prior to this decision. The case of
Pray v. Northern Liberties, though reported later, was decided
prior to Northern Liberties against St. John's Church, in which
it is mentioned. It was not a question of the exemption of
charitable institutions from taxation at all, but was an effort
on the part of an individual to escape payment of municipal
assessment on the ground that the amount due had not been
registered ni the office of the county commissioners, in
obedience to the Act of 1824, requiring all unpaid taxes to be
so registered. The court simply decided squarely that such
an assessment was not a tax. And when the question came
up in Northern Liberties v. St. John's Churclz, supra, Judge
COULTER, who had delivered the opinion in the former case,
referred to the fact that it had already been decided that such
assessments were not taxes, and added that it was evident on
the face of all the Acts relating to them in corporated districts,
that the legislature had the distinction in mind. In Pennock
v. Hoover, 5 Rawle, 291, decided fifteen years earlier, it had
been distinctly held that such assessments were taxes, under
the very Act of 1824, above referred to, and as such were a
lien prior to those of mechanics. In Borough of Greensburg
v. Young, 53 Pa. 280, such assessments were stated by Judge
THOIPSON, not to be taxes, citing the two Northern Liberties
cases, but the point before him was as to whether if their collec-
tion would exceed the amount the borough was permitted to
raise by taxation in any one year, they could not be im-
posed. The decision was no doubt entirely correct-such
could hardly have been the intention of the legislature.
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Subsequent cases, among which may be mentioned, Wash-
ington Ave., 69 Pa. 352, and Centre St., I15 Pa. 253, say that
such assessments can only be sustained under the power to
tax. Judge AGNEW, in Washington Avenue, just cited,
remarked that if Pray v. The Northern Liberties and the other
two cases, had meant that such assessments were not taxation
at all, it would in effect deny the power of the legislature to
authorize the assessments. Equally emphatic is the language
of the late Judge SHARSWOOD in Hammett v. City of Philadel-
phia, 65 Pa. 146. But the very question was squarely
decided in Olive Cemetery Co. v. Phziladelphia, 93 Pa. 129;
Erie v. ChUrch, 105 Pa. 280, and Philadelphia v. Church,
134 Pa. 207, in all of which the respective institutions were
held to be exempt.
In Olive Cemetery v. Phila., the court remarks: "If it were
at all necessary, it would be an easy task to show the wis-
dom and propriety of exempting such property as that of
the defendant in error from local taxation, but nothing of that
kind is required. It is sufficient to know that the legislature,
in creating the corporation, exempted its property from such
taxation." Counsel in this case had called the attention of
the court to some of the cases in New York, wherein a dif-
ferent rule had been laid down. This case was decided in
I88o. Four years later came the case of Erie v. the Church.
Here, again, many cases in other states were cited by counsel,
and the court was asked to depart from Olive Cemetery v.
Phi/a., and bring its rulings into agreement with those in other
-states. But this the court declined to do, saying, that the
last mentioned case had definitely settled that such an assess-
ment was a tax, and that, therefore, the church was exempt.
In 189o, the case of Phila. v. the Church was decided, and in
a short per curiam opinion the exemption from such taxation
was affirmed. In Phila. v. Penna. Hospital, 143 Pa. 167,
it was held that the obligation to curb and pave footways was
a police regulation, while the other assessments were taxes,
and, therefore, the one could be enforced and the other could
not, This case was simply an affirmance of Wilkinsburg v.
Home for Aged Women, 131 Pa. IO9, decided in 1889.
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The late Chief Justice, who delivered the opinion of the court
in that case, said in concluding: " We regret for the sake of
this deserving charity that we are unable to reach a different
conclusion. The law is too plain, however, to. admit of even
a doubt."
Prior to the adoption of the present constitution of 1874,
it had been definitely decided that such assessments were a
tax. That constitution (Art. ix) provides that "the general
assembly may, by general laws, exempt from taxation public
property and for public purposes, actual places of religious
worship," etc., etc. It does not specify the kind of taxes
from which such institutions may be freed, but simply that
that the legislature may exempt them from "taxation." By
Act of May 14, 1874, such institutions are exempted "from
all and every county, city, borough, bounty, road, school and
poor tax."
To the average mind, it would seem difficult to imagine a more
positive and comprehensive enactment. And, fortified as it has
been by the language of the Supreme Court in the cases already
cited, counsel who advised a client that an assessment of this
kind was not a tax, or was not included in the meaning of the
words of the constitution and Act of 1874. would have been
bold, indeed. More especially is this true, as the trend of deci-
sions has been to widen the scope of this Act in other ways, and
bring within its terms institutions, which certainly could have
been excluded without doing violence to its words, and to
hold certain "revenue and income" admittedly received by
certain institutions as not within the meaning of those words in
the Act. So that we are brought face to face with a practical
repeal of a portion of the statute, or the reading into it of an
exception not only not found in it expressly or impliedly, but
which had been distinctly declared not to exist. The decision
cannot but be regarded as an abrupt and startling departure
from the declared and well-settled policy of the Common-
wealth; and it is to be presumed that the court felt moved to
this by grave considerations of expediency; they say that
they consider their present ruling sound in principle, and
what they seem now to consider important, consonant with
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the rulings of other states. Now, let us examine some of the
rulings elsewhere, beginning with R. R. Co. v. Decatur, 147
U. S. 190, 197, relied on by the court. The statute under
consideration in that case was the Act of February I o, 185 I,
of the Illinois legislature, incorporating the Railroad Company.
By its 22d section, it declares: "The land selected [by the
company] . . . shall be exempt from all taxation under the
laws of this state. . . . After the expiration of six years
• . . an annual tax for state purposes shall be assessed by the
auditor upon all the property . . . belonging to said corpora-
tion. Whenever the taxes levied shall exceed . . . such excess
shall be deducted . . . and the said 'corporation is hereby
exempted from all taxation of every kind, except as herein pro-
vided for," etc., etc. The company was assessed for street
paving in front of some of its land. Mr. Justice BREWER, in a
long opinion, defends the distinction between general taxation
and local assessments as sound in principle.
Space forbids an argument upon this point here. But in
the course of his opinion, he says : "But it is said that it is
within the competency of the legislature, having full control
over the matter of general taxation and special assessments,
to exempt any particulaf- property from the burden of both,
and that it is not the province of the courts, when such entire
exemption has been made, to attempt to limit or qualify it
upcn their own ideas of natural practice." After citing num-
erous authorities, among them Olive Cemetery Co. v. Philadel-
phia and Erie v. Church, supra, he says: "This is undoubtedly
true," and then turns to the statute in hand, to apply the test.
Ar.d as it certainly would seem evident from that act that it
contemplated only general taxation, the decision cannot be
complained of. There was no question of a charity involved.
The whole question of policy and the surrounding circum-
stances were entirely different. The case was an affirmance of
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois, and the
Supreme Court of that State had held in several cases of
which City of Chicago v. Lanzed, 34 III. 203, is an example,
that such assessments were not taxes, but were an exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain, an additional reason:
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for construing the Act in question as not referring to
them.
In the case of Harvard College v. Boston, lO4 Mass. 470,
where the words used in the college charter were "all civil
impositions, taxes and rates," the words were held to include
such assessments. In the course of its opinion, the court
says, "it (the assessment) is in its legal character a tax, for it
is levied, and can only be levied under the power of taxation
confided by the constitution to the legislature." And after
citing a case in Rhode Island as an example of cases, to be
found elsewhere, they remark that the principle therein enun-
ciated that such assessments "are both in the theory of the
law and, in fact, but a return of a portion of the benefit
specially conferred by the improvement," and that "provisions
for exemption from taxes or impositions, whether existing in
general statute laws or in special charters, are not to be
deemed to include assessments for the improvement primarily
of certain special localities, and derived from and carved out
of the benefit conferred upon these special localities by these
improvements" does not meet with their concurrence.
In Boston Seamen's Friend v. Mayor and Aldermen, i16
Mass. 18 1, it was held that such assessments were not within
the meaning of the exemption in the General Statute Tax Act
of Massachusetts (Ch. 115, § 5, Ch. 37).
That Act provides a general tax law of the state, and
section five simply says: "The following property and polls
shall be exempt from taxation," and then follows an enum-
eration. In Vt. Auburn Cemetery v. The Mayor and Aldermen,
i 5o Mass. 12, the charter of the cemetery provided that its
land should be exempted from "all public taxes." It was
held that such assessments could not be collected-that it
was not the intention of the legislature that they should be-
and that the decision, in 116 Mass., supra, was under a general
law, and there was an implied limitation of the restriction to
taxes, which were the subject of the chapter.
In Brightman v. Kirner, 22 Wis. 54, the words in the
Act of 1854 were, "which amount of tax shall take the
-place and be in full of all taxes of every name and kind
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-upon sail roads, or other properties belonging to said con-
panies, or the stock held by individuals therein, and it shall
not be lawful to levy or assess thereupon any other or
further assessment or tax for any purpose whatever." In
spite of the fact that the city of Milwaukee, by its charter
-granted in 1852, had the power given it in express terms, to
assess real estate exempted from taxation under the law of the
state, it was held that the legislature had power to pass the
Act of 1854, and that its meaning was clear, and the assess-
ments could not be levied.
In The People v. Trustees of School, 118 Ill. 52, following
Chicago v. The People, held school property exempt from
assessments, as Well as general taxation, even though there
was no statute exempting it, on the ground that the Act of
-Congress enabling the people of Illinois to form a State Con-
stitution, provided that "the section, numbered 16, in every
township . . . shall be granted to the state for the use of
-the inhabitants of such township, for the use of schools," and
Art. 8, § 2, Const. Ill., 1870, provides that "all lands, moneys
-or other property donated, granted, or received for school,
college, seminary or university purposes, and the proceeds
thereof shall be faithfully applied to the objects for which s~zch
gifts or grants were made." At first blush, it is not easy to
see just why, under these provisions, schools are exempt at
all; but the court says that the reason is "the use for which
the property'was granted," and that the above provision of
the constitution prohibited the legislature from directly
appropriating this property to state or municipal purposes,
and it could not do so by the indirect means of taxation.
Counsel had made the usual argument that assessments took
nothing from the property, and the assessment is only the
"extent of the benefit conferred upon it by the improvement.
The court replies: " This may be so in theory, but not in
certainty," and "it should not be exposed to the danger of
being improved away, by being made to pay for supposed
benefits conferred upon it by improvements." Why in the
name of reason this answer could not be made in other
,cases, it is difficult to see, and yet this same court, in
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(Couno, of Adams v. Quincy, 130 Ill. 566, 574, quotes with
approval an opinion sustaining an assessment against a
cemetery company in the face of a statute exempting it from
"any tax or public imposition whatever!"
In R. R. v. St. Paul, 21 Minn. 526, it was held that "all
taxation and assessment whatever," including municipal assess-
ments. See, also, St. Paul v. R. R., 23 Minn. 469. So as to
"all public taxes and assessments :" State v. City of St. Paul,
36 Minn. 529. This was the case of a cemetery, and the
court remarks that the object is not only to aid the cemetery
in dollars and cents, "but mainly to preserve. cemeteries for
the particular use to which they have been appropriated, and
then in accordance with the common s~ntiments of mankind,
guard against the disturbance of the resting place of the dead,
which would naturally ensue if the ground was liable to be
sold to enforce the collection of taxes or assessments." See
Colston v. Cemetery Co. (Ky.), 15 S. W. Rep. 245. There are
undoubtedly a number of cases like that in Illinois in which
the plain and obvious meaning of an enactment has been con-
strued away. But many of them, as shown above, even those
which hold the word "taxation" in a general statute, not
to include municipal assessments, have given weight to the
meaning of the legislature, when it was at all clearly apparent.
In Pennsylvania, prior to the constitution of 1874, it had
expressly been held that such assessments were taxes and
could be nothing else. The Act of 1874 exempts" from all
and every county, city and borough, road, school and poor
tax." It was passed May 14, 1874. It is of one section,
and is a special exemption Act-not part of general law
authorizing taxation. It shows, as to charitable and religious
institutions, a desire to exempt only those which are strictly
and purely public charities-and only such of their property as
is in actual occupation-and these institutions it includes with
"court house, jails," in the exemption above. "All and
every" would seem to be a complete and thorough exemption
-and coupled with the fact that a road tax-a special tax
on the surrounding property for a special expenditure-so levied
because it is supposed that the immediate locality will be chiefly
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benefitted-is included in the provisions of the Act, would
.seem to make the meaning of the legislature too clear for
argument. It is true a road tax is not levied by the front-
.foot rule-but it is the same in general principle. In addition
to this, as before noticed, "tax" included municipal assess-
ments, according to the law as it stood when the Act was
,passed. Now, let us return for a moment to E~ic v. The
Church, IO5 Pa. 278. Here we find some of these argu-
ments recognized, and we are truly told by the court
(GORDON, J.), that "the Act speaks in no doubtful terms con-
cerning the exemption of this kind of property from every
variety of city tax," and that, as every one knows, that jails
and court houses are not intended to be taxed at all, churches,
etc., being classed with them, are also free--either both are
free, or neither is free-and "if this is not the true meaning
of the Act, I confess my inability to understand it."
But all this may be considered, perhaps, beside the mark.
The court expressly overrules its former decisions, and it
may, therefore, be useless to quote them. It will not, I think,
however, be obvious to the profession that consonancy with
decisions of other states, in a matter of internal policy like this,
was important, or even desirable. It is implied in the tenacious
clinging to local self-goverment that different localities may and
will desire different laws. And it can hardly be said that the
desired consonancy is secured-for it will be difficult to show
that the weight of authority would construe such a statute
in this way. Statutes are to be construed according to the
plain meaning of their words, unless there be some strong
reason to suppose that they are intended to have some unusual
meaning-this is a well recognized rule of construction, and
it is another well-known rule that a State Legislature is free to
pass any laws not prohibited by the constitution-it does not,
therefore, depend for its right to pass exemption laws upon
any constitutional grant. See Am. Encyc. Law, Vol. 25, p.
156. And this does not seem to be questioned elsewhere.
The effect of the decision will be to go down deeper into the
pockets of those who have established charities and churches
-and who by so doing have performed a noble public service.
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It is not worth while to argue so plain a proposition as that
both charities and churches save the community from terrible
charges and evils-and an uncalled for check to the altru-
istic spirit of those who have somp care for their fellow men
must be deplored, as it seems to me, as retrogression. It will
not do to push these considerations aside as mere sentiment-
alism. Some years ago the late venerated Judge Sharswood
declared that Christianity was part of the common law of Penn-
sylvania; and if she is alone in her policy, it is a position in
advance, not in the rear. Why change, when even the pecu-
niary gain to the treasury of any municipality would be in-
considerable-scarcely appreciable by the tax-payers-and yet
the burden upon deserving charities would be very severe?
Tempora inutantur-et nos mutamur in illis-six long years
have rolled around since the court expressed its regret that it
could not relieve a home for aged women, even of the duty of
repairing a sidewalk ; and its views have completely changed.
Many, however, who agreed with court in its regret, are of the
same opinion still. I intend, I need hardly say, no disrespect
to the court, and, as Judge Woodward said, in the Conscript
Cases, I must be understood as conceding to others the
freedom of opinion and rectitude of purpose, I claim for
myself-and in this spirit it is that I add, with him, "God
save the commonwealth if such a precedent is to be estab-
lished 1 " Lucius S. LANDRETH.
